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Generalized event structures and probabilities
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For the classical mind, quantum mechanics is boggling enough; nevertheless more bizarre behavior could
be imagined, thereby concentrating on propositional structures (empirical logics) that transcend the quantum
domain. One can also consistently suppose predictions and probabilities which are neither classical nor quan-
tum, but which are subject to subclassicality; that is, the additivity of probabilities for mutually exclusive,
co-measurable observables, as formalized by admissibility rules and frame functions.
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I. SPECKER’S ORACLE
In his first, programmatic, article on quantum logic Ernst
Specker – one of his sermons is preserved in his Selecta [1,
pp. 321-323] – considered a parable [2] which can be easily
translated into the following oracle: imagine that there are
three boxes on a table, each of which either contains a gem or
does not. Your task is to correctly choose two of the boxes that
will either both be empty or both contain a gem when opened.
Note that, according to combinatorics (or, more generally,
Ramsey theory), for all classical states there always exist two
such boxes among the three boxes satisfying the above prop-
erty of being “both empty or both filled.”
After you place your guess the two boxes whose content
you have attempted to predict are opened; the third box re-
mains closed. In Specker’s malign oracle scenario it turns out
that you always fail: no matter how often you try and what you
choose to forecast, the boxes you have predicted as both be-
ing empty or both being full always have mixed content – one
box is always filled and the other one always empty. That is,
phenomenologically, or, if you like, epistemically, Specker’s
oracle is defined by the following behavior: if e and f denote
the empty and the filled state, respectively, and ∗ stands for
the third (unopened) box, then one of the following six con-
figurations are rendered: e f∗, f e∗, e∗ f , f ∗ e, ∗e f , or ∗ f e.
Is such a Specker oracle realizable in Nature? Intu-
ition tends to negate this. Because, more formally, per box
there are two classical states e and f , and thus 23 such
classical “ontological” configurations or classical three-box
states, namely eee, ee f , e f e, f ee, e f f , f e f , f f e, and
f f f , which can be grouped into four classes: those ex-
treme cases with all the boxes filled and empty, those with
two empty and one filled boxes, and those with two filled
and one empty boxes. These can be represented by the
four-partitioning (into equivalence classes with respect to the
number of filled and empty boxes) of the set of all states
{{eee},{ f f f},{ee f ,e f e. f ee},{e f f , f e f ,e f f}}.
Now, on closer inspection, in any unbiased prediction (or
unbiased preparation) scenario there is an ever decreasing
chance that you will not hit the right prediction eventually,
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because for all eight possible configurations there always is at
least one right prediction (either two empty or two full boxes).
Of course, if I am in command of the preparation process,
and if you and me chose to conspire in such a way that I al-
ways choose to prepare, say, either eee or ee f or e f e or f ee,
and you always choose to predict f f , than you will never win.
But such a scenario is hilariously biased. Also with adap-
tive, that is, a posteriori, preparation after the prediction, the
Specker parable is realizable – in hindsight I can always ruin
your prediction. But if you allow no restrictions on predictions
(or preparations), and no a posteriori manipulation, there are
no classical means to realize Specker’s oracle.
Can this system be realized quantum mechanically? That
is, can one find a quantum state and projection measure-
ments rendering that kind of performance? I guess (but
have no proof of it) not, because in any finite dimensional
Hilbert space the associated empirical logic [3, 4] is a merging
through identifying common elements, called a pasting [5],
of (possibly a continuum of) Boolean subalgebras with a fi-
nite number of atoms or, used synonymously, contexts [6, 7].
And any subalgebra, according to the premises of Gleason’s
theorem [8–11], in terms of probability theory, is classically
Boolean.
As has already been pointed out by Specker, the phe-
nomenology of the oracle suggests, that ei → f j, and, con-
versely fi → e j for different Boxes i, j ∈ {1,2,3}, that is,
“the first opened box always contains the complement of the
second opened box”; and otherwise – that is, by disregard-
ing the third (unopened) box – they are classical. Thus one
could say that the contents of the two opened boxes represent
the two atoms of a Boolean subalgebra 22. There are three
such subalgebras associated with opening two of three boxes,
namely (1,2), (1,3), and (2,3) which need to be pasted into
the propositional structure at hand; in the quantum case this is
quantum logic.
This can be imagined in two ways, by interpreting the sit-
uation as follows: (i) The first option would be to attempt to
paste or “isomorphically bundle” the three subalgebras 22 into
a three-atomic subalgebra 23. Clearly this attempt is futile,
since this would imply transitivity, and thus yield a complete
contradiction, by, say e1 → f2 → e3 → f1. (ii) The second op-
tion would circumvent transitivity by means of complemen-
tarity (as argued originally by Specker), through a horizontal
pasting of the three Boolean algebras, amounting to a logic of
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Orthogonality diagrams with mixed two- and
three-atomic contexts, drawn in different colors.
the Chinese lantern form MO3. This is a common quantum
logic rendered, for instance, by spin- 12 measurements along
different spatial directions; as well as by the quasi-classical
partition logics [12] of automata and generalized urn mod-
els [13]. But clearly, such a logic does not deal with the three
boxes of Specker’s oracle equally; rather the third, unopened
box could be considered as a “space holder” or “indicator”
labeling the associated context.
Within such a context one could, for example, attempt
to consider a general wave function in eight dimensional
Hilbert space |Ψ〉 = ∑i, j,k∈{e, f}αi jk|i jk〉, geometrically rep-
resentable by |e〉 ≡ (1,0) and | f 〉 ≡ (0,1), and thus |Ψ〉 ≡
(αeee,αee f , . . . ,α f f f ). All three measurements (i.e. projec-
tions onto |i jk〉) commute; so one can open the boxes “inde-
pendently.” By listing all the associated “unbiased” measure-
ment scenarios (including partial traces over the third box),
there is no quantum way one could end up with the type of
behavior one expects from Specker’s oracle. Ultimately, be-
cause a general quantum state is a coherent superposition of
classical states, one cannot “break outside” this extended clas-
sical domain.
So, I guess, if one insists on treating all the three boxes
involved in Specker’s oracle equally, this device requires su-
pernatural means. And yet it is imaginable; and that is the
beauty of it.
II. OBSERVABLES UNREALIZABLE BY QUANTUM
MEANS
In what follows we shall enumerate, as a kind of continu-
ation of Specker’s oracle, hypothetical “weird” propositional
structures, in particular, certain anecdotal “zoo of collections
of observables” constructed by pastings of contexts (or, used
synonymously, blocks, subalgebras) containing “very few”
atoms. We shall compare them to logical structures associ-
ated with very low-dimensional quantum Hilbert spaces. (Ac-
tually, the dimensions dealt with will never exceed the number
of fingers on one hand.)
It is not too difficult to sketch propositional structures
which are not realizable by any known physical device. Take,
for instance, the collection of observables whose Greechie or,
by another wording, orthogonality diagram [14] is sketched
in Fig. 1. In Hilbert space realizations, the straight lines or
smooth curves depicting contexts represent orthogonal bases,
and points on these straight lines or smooth curves represent
(i) (ii) (iii)
FIG. 2. (Color online) Orthogonality diagrams representing tight tri-
angular pastings of two- and three-atomic contexts.
elements of these bases; that is, two points being orthogo-
nal if and only if they are on the same these straight line or
smooth curve. From dimension three onwards, bases can in-
tertwine [8] by possessing common elements.
The propositional structure depicted in Fig. 1 consists of
four contexts of mixed type; that is, the contexts involved have
two and three atoms. No such mixed type phenomenology
occurs in Nature; on the contrary, regardless of the quantized
system the number of (mutually exclusive) physical outcomes,
reflected by the dimension of the associated Hilbert space, al-
ways remains the same.
You may now say that this was an easy and almost triv-
ial cheat; but what about the triangular shaped propositional
structures depicted in Fig. 2? They surely look inconspic-
uous, yet none of them has a representation as a quantum
logic; simply because they have no realization in two- and
three-dimensional Hilbert space: The propositional structure
depicted in Fig. 2(i) has too tightly intertwining contexts,
which would mean that two different orthogonal bases in two-
dimensional Hilbert space can have an element in common
(which they cannot have, except when the bases are identical).
By a similar argument, the propositional structure depicted
in Fig. 2(ii) has “too tightly intertwined” contexs to be rep-
resentable in three-dimensional Hilbert space: in dimension
three, for two non-identical but intertwined orthogonal bases
with one common vector (if they have two common elements
they would have to be identical) it is impossible to “shuffle”
the remaining vectors around such that at least one remaining
vector from one basis is orthogonal to at least one remaining
vector from the other basis. From an algebraic point of view
all these propositional structures are not realizable quantum
mechanically, because they contain loops of order three [15–
17].
Indeed, for reasons that will be explicated later, the propo-
sitional structure depicted in Fig. 2(i) has no two-valued (ad-
missible [18–20]) state equivalent to a frame function [8]; a
fact that can be seen by ascribing one element a “1,” forcing
the remaining two to be “0.” (There cannot be only zeroes in
a context.) This means that it is no quasi classical partition
logic. The logic depicted in Fig. 2(ii) has sufficiently many
(indeed four) two-valued measures to be representable by a
partition logic [21]. The propositional structure depicted in
Fig. 2(iii) is too tightly interlinked to be representable by a
partition logic – it allows only one two-valued state.
In a similar manner one could go on and consider orthog-
onality diagrams of the “square” type, such as the ones de-
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Orthogonality diagrams representing tight
square type pastings of two- and three-atomic contexts.
picted in Fig. 3. All these propositional structures are not re-
alizable quantum mechanically, because they contain loops of
order four [15–17]. The propositional structure in Fig. 3(i)
has two two-valued measures, but the union of them is not
“full” because it cannot separate opposite atoms. Figs. 3(ii)
as well as (iii) represent propositional structures with “suffi-
ciently many” two-valued measures (e.g. separating two ar-
bitrary atoms by different values), which are representable as
partition (and, in particular, as generalized urn and automa-
ton) logics. Actually, the number of two-valued measures for
the propositional structures in Figs. 3(i) as well as (iii) can be
found by counting the number of permutations, or permuta-
tion matrices: these are 2! and 3!, respectively. Because of the
too tightly intertwined contexts the propositional structure in
Fig. 3(iv) has no two-valued state.
Let us now come back to the collection of observables rep-
resented in Fig. 1. Are they in some form realizable, maybe
even in ways “beyond” quantum realizability? Again, as long
as there are “sufficiently many” two-valued measures [22],
partition logics as well as their generalized urn and automaton
models [12] are capable of reproducing these phenomenolog-
ical schemes. One construction yielding the pasting described
in Fig. 1(ii) would involve a four color (associated with the
four contexts) scheme; with three symbols “+,” “−,” and “0”
in two colors representing the Boolean algebra 23 of two con-
texts, and with two symbols “+,” and “−” in two colors rep-
resenting the Boolean algebra 22 of two contexts. (I leave it
to the Reader to find a concrete realization; one systematic
way would be the enumeration of all two-valued measures.)
Fig. 1(iii) does not possess a quasi-classical simulacrum in
terms of a partition logic. For the sake of a proof by con-
tradiction [14], suppose there exist a two-valued state. Any
such two-valued state needs to have exactly two 1s on the hor-
izontal contexts, whereas it needs to have exactly three 1s on
the vertical contexts; but both contexts yield (two- and three-
atomic) partitions of the entire set of atoms; thus implying
2 = 3, which is clearly wrong.
So, in a sense, one could say that the collection of observ-
ables represented in Fig. 1(iii) is “weirder” than the ones rep-
resented in Figs. 1(i)-(iii).
III. GENERALIZED PROBABILITIES BEYOND THE
QUANTUM PREDICTIONS
When it comes to observables and probabilities there are
two fundamental questions: (i) Given a particular collection of
observables; what sort of probability measures can this propo-
sitional structure support or entail [23, 24]? (ii) Conversely,
given a particular probability measure; which observables and
what propositional structure can be associated with this prob-
ability [25, 26]? We shall mainly concentrate on the first ques-
tion.
A caveat is in order: it might as well be that, from a certain
perspective, we might not be forced to “leave” or modify clas-
sical probability theory: for example, quantum probabilities
could be interpreted as classical conditional probabilities [27],
where conditioning is with respect to fixed experimental set-
tings, in particular, with respect to the context measured.
A. Subclassicality and frame functions
In order to construct probability measures on non-Boolean
propositional structures which can be obtained by pasting to-
gether contexts we shall adhere to the following assumption
which we would like to call subclassicality: every context (i.e.,
Boolean subalgebra, block) is endowed with classical proba-
bilities. In particular, any probability measure on its atoms
is additive. This is quite reasonable, because it is prudent to
maintain the validity of classical probability theory on those
classical substructures of the propositional calculus that con-
taining observables which are mutually co-measurable.
Subclassicality can be formalized by frame functions in the
context of Hilbert spaces [8–11] as follows: A frame function
of unit weight for a separable Hilbert space H is a real-valued
function f defined on the (surface of the) unit sphere of H such
that if {ei} is an orthonormal basis of H then ∑i f (ei) = 1.
This can be translated for pastings of contexts by identifying
the set of atoms {ai} in a particular context C with the set of
vectors in one basis, and by requireing that ∑i f (ai) = 1 for all
contexts C involved.
For pastings of contexts on value definite systems of ob-
servables, admissibility, which originally has been conceived
as a formalization of “partial value definiteness” and value in-
definiteness [18–20] is essentially equivalent to the require-
ments imposed upon frame functions; that is, subclassicality.
Nevertheless, one could also request generalized admissibil-
ity rules as follows. Let O be a set of atoms in a proposi-
tional structure, and let f : O → [0,1] be a probability mea-
sure. Then f is admissible if the following condition holds
for every context C of O: for any a ∈ C with 0 ≤ f (a) ≤ 1,
∑i f (bi) = 1− f (a) for all bi ∈ C \ {a}. Likewise, for two-
valued measures v on value definite systems of observables,
admissibility [18–20] can be defined in analogy to frame func-
tions: for any context C = {a1, . . . ,an} of O, the two-valued
measure on the atoms a1, . . . ,an has to add up to one; that is,
∑i v(ai) = 1.
For the sake of a (quasi-) classical formalization, define
a two-valued measure (or, used synonymously, valuation, or
4truth assignment) v on a single context C = {a1, . . . ,an} to
acquire the value v(ai) = 1 on exactly one ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n of
the atoms of the context, and the value zero on the remaining
atoms v(a j 6=i) = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Any (quasi-) classical proba-
bility measure, or, used synonymously, state, or non-negative
frame function f (of weight one), on this context can then be
obtained by a convex combination of all m two-valued mea-
sures; that is,
f = ∑
1≤k≤m
λkvk, with
1 = ∑
1≤k≤m
λk, and λk ≥ 0.
(1)
As far as classical physics is concerned, that is all there is –
the classical probabilities are just the convex combinations of
the m two-valued measures on the Boolean algebras 2m.
This convex combination can be given a geometrical in-
terpretation: First encode every two-valued measure on C as
some m-tuple, whereby the i’th component of the m-tuple is
identified with the value v(ai) of that valuation on the i’th
atom of the context C; and then interpret the resulting set of
m-tuples as the set of the vertices of a convex polytope.
By the Minkoswki-Weyl representation theorem [28, p.29],
every convex polytope has a dual (equivalent) description: ei-
ther as the convex hull of its extreme points (vertices); or as
the intersection of a finite number of half-spaces. More gen-
erally, one can do this not only on the atoms of one context,
but also on a selection of atoms and joint probabilities of two
or more contexts [29–32]. This results in what Boole [33, 34]
called “conditions of possible experience” for the “concur-
rence of events.” In an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen setup one
ends up in Bell-type inequalities, which are prominently vi-
olated by quantum probabilities and correlations. Alas, the
quantum correlations do not violate the inequalities maxi-
mally, which has led to the introduction of so-called “nonlocal
boxes” [35], which may be obtained by “sharpening” the two-
partite quantum correlations to a Heaviside function [36].
As long as there are “sufficiently many” two-valued mea-
sures (e.g. capable of separating two arbitrary atoms)
one might generalize this strategy to non-Boolean propo-
sitional structures. In particular, one could obtain quasi-
classical probability measures by enumerating all two-valued
measures, and by then taking the convex combination (1)
thereof [6]. One can do this because a two-valued measure has
to “cover” all involved contexts simultaneously: if subclassi-
cality is assumed, then the same two-valued measure defined
on one context contributes to all the other contexts in such a
way that the sums of that measure, taken along any such con-
text has to be additive and yield one.
B. Cat’s cradle configurations
Consider a propositional structure depicted in Fig. 4. As
Pitowsky [23, 24] has pointed out, the reduction of some prob-
abilities of atoms at intertwined contexts yields
p1 + p7 =
3
2
− 1
2
(p12 + p13 + p2 + p6 + p8)≤ 32 , (2)
a3 a4 a5
a2 a6
a1 a7a13
a12 a8
a11 a10 a9
FIG. 4. (Color online) Orthogonality diagram of a cats cradle logic
which requires that, for two-valued measures, if v(a1) = 1, then
v(a7) = 0. For a partition logic as well as for a Hilbert space re-
alization see Refs. [6, 37].
because all probabilities pi are non-negative. Indeed, if one
applies the standard quantum mechanical Born (trace) rule to
a particular realization enumerated in Fig. 4 of Ref. [37], then,
as a1 ≡ 1√3
(√
2,−1,0
)
and a7 ≡ 1√3
(√
2,1,0
)
, the quantum
probability of finding the quantum in a state spanned by a7
if it has been prepared in a state spanned by a1 is p7(a1) =
〈a7|a1〉2 = 19 . Together with p1(a1) = 〈a1|a1〉2 = 1 we obtain
p1(a1)+ p7(a1) = 109 , which satisfies the classical bound
3
2 .
Indeed, a closer look at the quantum probabilities reveals
that, with a13 ≡ (0,1,0), a6,8 ≡ 12√3
(
−1,√2,±3
)
, p12(a1) =
p2(a1) = 0, p13(a1) = 13 , and p6(a1) = p8(a1) =
4
9 , the classi-
cal bounds of probability (2) – Boole’s conditions of possible
experience – are perfectly satisfied by the quantum predic-
tions, since 1+ 19 =
3
2 − 12
(
0+ 13 + 0+
2
9 +
2
9
)
. This was to be
expected, as Eq. (2) has been derived by supposing subclas-
sicality which is satisfied both by quasi-classical (e.g. gen-
eralized urn as well as automata) models as well as quantum
mechanics.
But does that mean that the classical and quantum predic-
tions coincide? The quantum predictions, computed under the
assumption that the system is prepared in state a1 and thus
p1(a1) = 1, are enumerated in Fig. 5(i). Note that the sum of
the probabilities of each context has to sum up to unity.
In contrast to the quantum predictions, with the same prepa-
ration, the classical predictions cannot yield any p7(a1) other
than zero, because by the way the logic is constructed there
does not exist any two-valued measure satisfying p1(a1) =
p7(a1) = 1. (This is easily derivable by proving the impos-
sibility of any such measure [38].) They are enumerated in
Fig. 5(ii). The full parametrization of all conceivable classical
probabilities is depicted in Fig. 5(iii).
So, if one interprets this argument in terms of a (state de-
pendent) Boole-Bell type inequality, all it needs is to pre-
pare a three-state quantum system in a state along a1 ≡
1√
3
(√
2,−1,0
)
and measure the projection observable along
a7 ≡ 1√3
(√
2,1,0
)
. In a generalized beam splitter setup [39],
once the detector associated with a7 clicks on the input asso-
ciated with port a1 one knows that the underlying physical re-
alization is “quantum-like” and not classical. This represents
another type of violation of Boole’s conditions of possible ex-
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1
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λ10 +λ11+
+λ12 +λ13 +λ14
λ2 +λ6+
+λ7 +λ8
λ1 +λ3 +λ4+
+λ12 +λ13 +λ14
λ4 +λ5 +λ6+
+λ7 +λ8 +λ9
λ2 +λ6 +λ8+
+λ11 +λ12 +λ14
λ1 +λ2 +λ3 λ7 +λ10 +λ13
λ1 +λ4 +λ5+
+λ10 +λ11+
+λ12λ4 +λ6 +λ9+
+λ12 +λ13 +λ14
λ3 +λ5 +λ8+
+λ9 +λ11 +λ14
λ5 +λ7 +λ8+
+λ10 +λ11
λ3 +λ9+
+λ13 +λ14
λ1 +λ2 +λ4+
+λ6 +λ12
(iii)
FIG. 5. (Color online) Orthogonality diagram of the logic depicted
in Fig. 4 with overlaid (i) quantum and (ii) classical prediction prob-
abilities for a state prepared along a1. The classical predictions
require that x, y and z are non-negative and x + y + z = 1. (iii)
The full parametrization of classical probabilities; with non-negative
λ1, . . .λ14 ≥ 0, and λ1 + · · ·+ λ14 = 1. Note that the special case
(ii) is obtained by identifying with λ1 = x, λ2 = y, λ3 = z, and
λ4, . . .λ14 = 0.
perience by quantized systems.
There exist more quantum predictions contradicting (quasi-
) classical predictions based on additivity: suppose a tandem
cat’s cradle logic, which are just two cat’s cradle logics in-
tertwined at three contexts per copy, with a non-separating
set of two-valued states already discussed by Kochen and
Specker [40, Γ3, p. 70], and explicitly parameterized in
three-dimensional real Hilbert space by Tkadlec [41, Fig. 1],
thereby continuing the observables and preparations already
used earlier. Classical predictions based on this set of ob-
servables would require that that if one prepares a quan-
tized system in a1 ≡ 1√3
(√
2,−1,0
)
and measure it along
b ≡ 1√3
(
−1,√2,0
)
, the measurement would always yield a
positive result, because every two-valued measure v on that
logic must satisfy v(a1) = v(b) = 1. However, the quantum
predictions, also satisfying subclassicality, are 〈b|a1〉2 = 89 .
The full hull computation [42] reveals the Boole-Bell type
a1
a3
a5
a7
a9
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5a6
a7
a8
a9
a10
(i) (ii)
FIG. 6. (Color online) Orthogonality diagram of the reduced pen-
tagon (i), and of the pentagon logic (ii). A realization of (ii) in terms
of partition logic is enumerated in Eq. (4); an explicit quantum real-
izaion can be found in Ref. [37].
conditions of possible experience
p1 + p2 + p6 ≥ p4 + p8,
p1 + p2 ≥ p4,
p1 + 2p2 + p6 ≥ 2p4 + p8,
p2 + p6 ≥ p4, . . .
p10 + p2 + p6 ≥ p4 + p8,
p4 + p8 + 1≥ p1 + p10 + p2 + p6,
p8 + 1≥ p1 + p10 + p2,
p4 + 1≥ p1 + p2 + p6,
p4 + p5 ≥ p1 + p2,
p1 + p2 + p6 + p7 ≥ p4 + 1,
p4 + p8 + p9 ≥ p1 + p2 + p6,
p1 + p10+ p11 + p2 + p6 ≥ p4 + p8 + 1,
p12 + p4 + p8 ≥ p10 + p2 + p6,
p10 + p13 + p4 ≥ 1
(3)
as bounds of the polytope spanned by the two-valued mea-
sures interpreted as vertices. Some of these classical bounds
are enumerated in Eq. (3). A fraction of these, in particular,
p2 + p6 ≥ p4 is violated by the quantum probabilities men-
tioned earlier, as p2 = 0, p6 = 29 , and p4 =
1
3 .
C. Pentagon configuration
There exist, however, probabilities that are neither quasi-
classical nor quantum-like although they satisfy subclassical-
ity, and although the underlying logic can be realized both
quasi-classically by partition logics as well as quantum me-
chanically. For the sake of an example, we shall discuss
Wright’s dispersionless state [22] on the logic whose orthog-
onality diagram is a pentagon, as depicted in Fig. 6(ii).
What are the probabilities of prediction associated with
such structures? The propositional structure depicted in
Fig. 6(i) has no two-valued state, and just allows a single
probability measure which is constant on all atoms; that is,
p1 = p3 = p5 = p7 = p9 = 12 .
This prediction or oracle is still allowed by the subclassical-
ity rule even if one adds one atom per block. But, as has been
6v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6
v7 v8 v9
v10 v11
FIG. 7. Two-valued measures on the pentagon logic of Fig. 6.
pointed out by Wright [22], it can neither be operationally re-
alized by any quasi-classical nor by any quantum oracle. For
quasi-classical systems, this can explicitly be demonstrated by
enumerating all two-valued measures on this “pentagon logic”
of Fig. 6(ii), as depicted in Fig. 7. Note that no measure ex-
ists which is non-zero only on the atoms located at intertwin-
ing contexts; that is, which does not vanish at one (or more)
atoms at intertwining contexts, and at the same time vanishes
at all the “middle” atoms belonging to only one context. Be-
cause the quasi-classical probabilities are just the convex sum
Eq. (1) over all the two-valued measures it is clear that no
classical probability vanishes at all non-intertwining atoms;
in particular one which is 12 on all intertwining atoms.
A straightforward extraction [6, 12] based on two-valued
measures in Fig. 7 yields the partition logic – which is
the pasting of subalgebras specified by partitions of the set
{1,2, . . . ,11} in such a way that any atom is represented by
the set of indices of two-valued measures acquiring the value
one on that atom – of indices of the two-valued measures enu-
merated in Eq. (4); that is, in terms of the subscripts of the
two-valued measures (i.e., vi → i),
{{{1,2,3},{7,8,9,10,11},{4,5,6}},
{{4,5,6},{1,3,9,10,11},{2,7,8}},
{{2,7,8},{1,4,6,10,11},{3,5,9,3}},
{{3,5,9,3},{1,2,4,7,11},{6,8,10}},
{{6,8,10},{4,5,7,9,11},{1,2,3}}}
(4)
These partitions directly translate into the classical prob-
abilities which are, for instance, realizable by generalized
urn or automaton models. Fig. 8 parameterizes all classi-
cal probabilities through non-negative λ1, . . . ,λ11 ≥ 0 with
λ1 + · · ·+λ11 = 1, subject to subclassicality.
λ1 +λ2 +λ3
λ7 +λ8 +λ9 +λ10 +λ11
λ4 +λ5 +λ6
λ1 +λ3 +λ9 +λ10 +λ11
λ2 +λ7 +λ8λ1 +λ4 +λ6 +λ10 +λ11
λ3 +λ5 +λ9 +λ3
λ1 +λ2 +λ4 +λ7 +λ11
λ6 +λ8 +λ10
λ4 +λ5 +λ7 +λ9 +λ11
FIG. 8. (Color online) Classical probabilities on the pentagon logic.
The hull computation [42] reveals the Boole-Bell type con-
ditions of possible experience
p4 + p8 ≥ p1, . . .
p4 + 1≥ p1 + p2 + p6,
p4 + p8 + 1≥ 2p1 + p2 + p6,
p1 + p2 ≥ p4,
p1 + p2 + p6 ≥ p4 + p8,
2p1 + p10 + p2 + p6 ≥ p4 + p8 + 1
(5)
as bounds of the polytope spanned by the two-valued mea-
sures interpreted as vertices. Some of these classical bounds
are enumerated in Eq. (5). Wright’s measure, with p1 = 12 and
p4 = p8 = 0, violates the first inequality.
D. Triangle configurations
Very similar arguments hold also for the propositional
structures depicted in Figs. 2(i),(ii): Fig. 9(i) repre-
sents a trivial classical prediction with equal probabili-
ties. Fig. 9(ii) represents all classical predictions; the prob-
ability measures being read off from the partition logic
{{{1},{3},{2}},{{2},{1},{3}},{{3},{2},{1}}} obtained
from the three two-valued states on the logic in Fig. 2(ii).
Figs. 9(i),(iii) represent predictions 12 for all atoms at which
the three contexts intertwine. Fig. 9(iii) represents a Wright
prediction. None of the propositional structures depicted in
Figs. 9(i)–(iii) allows a quantum realization.
Nevertheless, in four-dimensional Hilbert space, the propo-
sitional structure with a triangular shaped orthogonality dia-
gram allows a gemetric representation; a particular one is ex-
plicitly enumerated in Fig. 4 of Ref. [21] whose classical prob-
abilities are exhausted by the parameterization in Fig. 9(v),
read off from the complete set of 14 two-valued measures
enumerated in Fig. 5 of Ref. [21]. Fig. 9(iv) represents a
Wright prediction, which cannot be realized classically as
well as quantum mechanically for the same reasons as men-
tioned earlier. In the quantum case, the proof of Theorem 2.2
of Ref. [22] can be directly transferred to the four-dimensional
configuration.
The hull computation [42] reveals the Boole-Bell type con-
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p1 = λ1 +λ2 p3 = λ8 +λ9+
+λ10 +λ11 +λ12
p2 = λ3 +λ4+
+λ5 +λ6 +λ7
p4 = λ13 +λ14
p7 = λ3 +λ8
p6 = λ2 +λ6 +λ7+
+λ11 +λ12
p5 = λ1 +λ4 +λ5+
+λ9 +λ10
p8 = λ4 +λ6 +λ9+
+λ11 +λ13
p9 = λ5 +λ7 +λ10+
+λ12 +λ14
(v)
FIG. 9. (Color online) Classical probabilities (i) and (ii) of the tight
triangular pastings of two- and three-atomic contexts introduced in
Figs. 9(i),(ii); with x,y,z ≥ 0, and x + y + z = 1. The prediction
probabilities represented by (iii) as well as (iv) are neither classical
nor quantum mechanical. The classical probabilities on the trian-
gle logic with four atoms per context are enumerated in (v); again
λ1, . . . ,λ14 ≥ 0 and again λ1 + · · ·+λ14 = 1.
ditions of possible experience
p5 + p6 ≥ p1, . . .
p5 + p6 + 1≥ 2p1 + p2 + p3 + p8,
p1 + p2 + p3 ≥ p5 + p6,
p5 + p6 + p7 ≥ p1 + p2 + p3
2p1 + p2 + p3 + p8 + p9 ≥ p5 + p6 + 1
(6)
as bounds of the polytope spanned by the two-valued mea-
sures interpreted as vertices. Some of these classical bounds
are enumerated in Eq. (6). Wright’s measure, with p1 = 12 and
p5 = p6 = 0, violates the first inequality.
E. Gleason theorem and Kochen-Specker configurations
The strategy to obtain predictions and probabilities by tak-
ing the convex sum of (sufficiently many) two-valued mea-
sures satisfying subclassicality fails completely for quantum
systems with three or more mutually exclusive outcomes –
that is, for quantum Hilbert spaces of dimensions greater than
two: in this case, two-valued measures do not exist even on
certain finite substructures thereof [20, 40].
However, if one still clings to the subclassicality assump-
tion – essentially requiring that every context of maximally
co-measurable observables is behaving classically, and thus
should be endowed with classical probabilities – then Glea-
son’s theorem [8–11] derives the Born (trace) rule for quan-
tum probabilities from subclassicality. Indeed, as already ob-
served by Gleason, it is easy to see that, in the simplest case,
such a subclassical (admissible) probability measure can be
obtained in the form of a frame function fρ by selecting some
unit vector |ρ〉, corresponding to a pure quantum state (prepa-
ration), and, for each closed subspace corresponding to a one-
dimensional projection observable (i.e. an elementary yes-no
proposition) E = |e〉〈e| along the unit vector |e〉, and by tak-
ing fρ(|e〉) = 〈ρ|e〉〈e|ρ〉 = |〈e|ρ〉|2 as the square of the norm
of the projection of |ρ〉 onto the subspace spanned by |e〉.
The reason for this is that, because an arbitrary context can
be represented as an orthonormal basis {|ei〉}, an ad hoc frame
function fρ on any such context (and thus basis) can be ob-
tained by taking the length of the orthogonal (with respect to
the basis vectors) projections of |ρ〉 onto all the basis vec-
tors |ei〉, that is, the norm of the resulting vector projections
of |ρ〉 onto the basis vectors, respectively. This amounts to
computing the absolute value of the Euclidean scalar products
〈ei|ρ〉 of the state vector with all the basis vectors. In order
that all such absolute values of the scalar products (or the as-
sociated norms) sum up to one and yield a frame function of
weight one, recall that |ρ〉 is a unit vector and note that, by
the Pythagorean theorem, these absolute values of the indi-
vidual scalar products – or the associated norms of the vector
projections of |ρ〉 onto the basis vectors – must be squared.
Thus the value fρ(|ei〉) of the frame function on the argument
|ei〉 must be the square of the scalar product of |ρ〉 with |ei〉,
corresponding to the square of the length (or norm) of the re-
spective projection vector of |ρ〉 onto |ei〉. For complex vector
spaces one has to take the absolute square of the scalar prod-
uct; that is, fρ(|ei〉) = |〈ei|ρ〉|2.
Pointedly stated, from this point of view the probabilities
fρ(|ei〉) are just the (absolute) squares of the coordinates of a
unit vector |ρ〉 with respect to some orthonormal basis {|ei〉},
representable by the square |〈ei|ρ〉|2 of the length of the vec-
tor projections of |ρ〉 onto the basis vectors |ei〉. The squares
come in because the absolute values of the individual com-
ponents do not add up to one; but their squares do. These
considerations apply to Hilbert spaces of any, including two,
finite dimensions. In this non-general, ad hoc sense the Born
rule for a system in a pure state and an elementary propo-
sition observable (quantum encodable by a one-dimensional
projection operator) can be motivated by the requirement of
subclassicality for arbitrary finite dimensional Hilbert space.
Note that it is possible to generate “Boole-Bell type in-
equalities (sort of)” if one is willing to abandon subclassi-
cality. That is, suppose one is willing to accept that, within
any particular context mutually excluding observables are not
mutually exclusive any longer. In particular, one could con-
sider two-valued measures in which all or some or none of
the atoms acquire the value zero or one (with subclassical-
ity, the two-valued measure is one at only a single atom; all
other atoms have measure zero). With these assumptions one
can, for every context, define a “correlation observable” as the
product of the (non-subclassical) measures of all the atoms
in this context. For instance, for any particular i’th context
Ci with atoms ai,1, . . . ,ai,n; then the “joint probabilities” Pi or
8“joint expectations” Ei of a single contextCi take on the values
Pi =
n
∏
j=1
v(ai, j) = v(ai,1) · · ·v(ai,n),
Ei =
n
∏
j=1
[1− 2v(ai, j)] = [1− 2v(ai,1)] · · · [1− 2v(ai,n)] .
(7)
A geometric interpretation in terms of convex correlation
polytopes is then straightforward – the tuples representing the
edges of the polytopes are obtained by the enumeration of the
“joint probabilities” Pi or the “joint expectations” Ei for all the
involved contexts Ci.
For example, solving the hull problem for the “correlation
polytope” of a system of observables introduced in Ref. [43]
and depicted in Fig. 10 yields, among 274 facet inequalities,
0 ≤ P1 ≤ 1
P1 + 3≥ P2 +P6 +P7+P8
P1 +P3 +P5 + 4≥ P2 +P4 +P6 +P7 +P8+P9
. . .
−1≤ E1 ≤ 1,
E1 + 7≥ E2 +E3 +E4 +E5 +E6 +E7 +E8 +E9,
E1 +E8 +E9 + 7≥ E2 +E3 +E4 +E5 +E6 +E7,
E1 +E6 +E7 +E8 +E9 + 7≥ E2 +E3 +E4 +E5,
E1 +E4 +E5 +E6 +E7 +E8 +E9 + 7≥ E2 +E3,
E1 +E2 +E3 +E4 +E5 +E6 +E7 +E8 +E9 + 7≥ 0.
(8)
The last bound has been introduced in Ref. [44]. It is violated
both by classical models (satisfying subclassicality) as well
as by quantum mechanics, because both cases obey subclassi-
cality, thereby rendering the value “−1” for any “correlation
observable” E1, . . . ,E9 of all nine tightly intertwined contexts
C1, . . . ,C9: in each context, there is an odd number of “−1”-
factors. For the sake of demonstration, Fig. 10 also explicitly
enumerates one (of 1152 non-admissible, non-subclassical)
value assignments yielding the bound seven.
However, note that the associated observables, and also the
two-valued measures and frame functions, have been allowed
to disrespect subclassicality; because otherwise no two-valued
measure exists.
Note also that similar calculations [29–32] for two- and
three-partite correlations do not suffer from a lack of sub-
classicality, since in an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen setup, the
observables entering as factors in the product – coming from
different particles – are independent (therefore justifying mul-
tiplication of single-particle probabilities and expectations),
and not part of a one and the same single-particle context.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have discussed “bizarre” structures of observables and
have considered classical, quantum and other, more “bizarre”
probability measures on them. Thereby we have mostly as-
sumed subclassicality, which stands for additivity within con-
texts, formalized by frame functions as well as admissibil-
ity [8–11].
−1
+1
−1
+1
+1
+1
−1
+1
+1+1
+1+1
+1+1
+1−1
−1+1
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8C9
FIG. 10. (Color online) Orthogonality diagram of a finite subset
C1, . . . ,C9 of the continuum of blocks or contexts embeddable in
four-dimensional real Hilbert space without a two-valued probabil-
ity measure [43]; with one of the 1152 non-admissible value assign-
ments yielding the bound seven, as derived in Ref [44]. In contrast,
subclassicality would require that, within each one of the nine con-
texts, exactly one observable would have value “−1,” and the other
three observables would have the value “+1.”
From all of this one might conclude a simple lesson: in
non-Boolean empirical structures which allow both a quan-
tum as well as a quasi-classical representation (rendering a
homeomorphic embedding into some larger Boolean algebra)
the predictions from quantum and classical probabilities (ren-
dered by the convex combination of two-valued measures)
may be different. Which ones are realized depends on the na-
ture of the system (e.g. quasi-classical generalized urn models
or finite automata, or quantum states of orthohelium [40]) in-
volved.
Such structures may also allow (non-dispersive) probabili-
ties and predictions which can neither be realized by (quasi-)
classical nor be quantized systems. Stated pointedly: even if
one assumes subclassicality – that is, the validity of classical
predictions within contexts in the form of maximal subsets of
observables which are mutually co-measurable – in general
(i.e. in non-Boolean cases) the structure of observables does
not determinate the probabilities completely.
Finally, let us speculate that if we were living in a com-
putable universe capable of universal computation, then uni-
versality would imply we could see the types of collections of
observables sketched in Figs. 1-2; at least if some (superse-
lection) rule would not prohibit the occurrence of such propo-
sitional structures. Why do we not observe them? Maybe we
have not looked closely enough, or maybe the Universe is not
entirely “universal” in terms of fundamental phenomenology.
I personally have a rather simple stance towards these is-
sues, which comes out of my inclinations [45] towards “The
Church of the larger Hilbert space.” I believe that Dirac [46]
and von Neumann [3] had it all right – alas in a surprising,
literal way. The quantum universe appears to be the geometry
of linear vector space equipped with a scalar product (projec-
tions). From this point of view, all those bizarre structures
of observables and prediction probabilities do not show up
9just because, after all, our operationally accessible universe,
at least on the most fundamental level, has to be understood in
purely geometric terms, thereby disallowing some algebraic
possibilities. This may be similar to the non-maximal viola-
tion of certain Boole-Bell type conditions of possible experi-
ence.
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